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Heuristics Human Factors Aviation 
HEURISTICS TO IMPROVE HUMAN FACTORS PERFORMANCE IN AVIATION 
William A. Tuccio 
Abstract 
This paper reviews literature related to heuristic cognitive strategies as they are used by flight crews. A review of 
heuristic and naturalistic cognition is presented. An example set of heuristics and cognitive biases are presented and 
where possible exemplified by 19 airline accidents. The paper suggests two tentative research designs which could 
be pursued to quantitatively study heuristics and its impact on aviation decision making. The paper concludes that 
aviation pilot training would benefit by introducing pilots to the concepts and constructs of heuristic thinking. 
This paper reviews the literature related to a variety of 
cognitive strategies under the broad umbrella of heuristics 
and biases. Where possible, the heuristics are demonstrated 
against 19 example airline accidents. Following the 
cognitive introduction, an inventory of heuristics is 
presented aimed at demonstrating that time limited decision 
making is defined by heuristic cognitive strategies. A 
research model is suggested to quantitatively study 
heuristics in aviation. The paper concludes that aviation 
pilot training would benefit by introducing pilots to the 
concepts and constructs of heuristic thinking. 
Human Factors and Heuristics Background 
In their book, The Limits of Expertise, Dismukes, Berman, 
and Loukopoulos analyze 19 airline accidents occurring 
over a near ten year period. While the authors draw out 
many themes and proximate causes of the accidents, Table 
1 (see Appendix) summarizes the cognitive aspects of each 
accident. The cognitive aspects often point out faults in 
human decision making, such as plan continuation bias, the 
anchoring heuristic and availability heuristic (Dismukes, 
Berman, & Loukopoulos, 2007). Throughout this paper, 
reference will be made to Table 1 as examples of cognitive 
constructs. 
Heuristic thought processes fall under the broader 
topic of naturalistic decision making and bounded 
rationality. The term heuristic is an often misunderstood 
term. In the popular mathematics book, How to Solve It, 
P6lya introduces heuristic as, 
Heuristic reasoning is reasoning not regarded as 
final and strict but as provisional and plausible 
JAAER, Spring 2011 
only, whose purpose is to discover the solution of 
the present problem ... We shall attain complete 
certainty when we shall have obtained the 
complete solution, but before obtaining certainty 
we must often be satisfied with a more or less 
plausible guess. We may need the provisional 
before we attain the final. We need heuristic 
reasoning when we construct a strict proof as we 
need scaffolding when we erect a building. (P6lya, 
1985, p. 113) 
P6lya is pointing out that many aspects of problem 
solving may end up in a state of complete certainty, but 
problems often require thinking which is sufficient for the 
problem at hand. Heuristic reasoning may therefore either be 
a means or an end in problem solving: for probabilistic 
solutions, heuristics can be an end, while for problems 
requiring certainty, heuristics may be a means to an end. 
P6lya' s heuristics view supports and complements the views 
of Nobel Prize economist Herbert A. Simon who posited a 
view of problem solving known as satisficing. Simon 
suggests real-world solutions by organisms and economics 
are often practically defined not by rationality or even 
probabilistic, recursive optimization, instead by a solution 
which is sufficient for the problem at hand, 
Since the organism, like those of the real world, 
has neither the senses nor the wits to discover an 
'optimal path'---even assuming the concept of 
optimal to be clearly defined-we are concerned 
only with finding a choice mechanism that will 
lead it to pursue a 'satisficing' path, a path that will 
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permit satisfaction at some specified level of all of 
its needs. (Simon, 1956, p. 136) 
Simon advances P6lya's heuristic concepts into a 
framework where problem solving is defined holistically by 
considering both the person making the decision and the 
environment where the decision is made. Gigerenzer and 
Todd build upon Simon, and contrast the views of 
unbounded rationality and ecological rationality (1999). As 
shown in Figure 1, unbounded rationality, characterized by 
Gigerenzer and Todd as "Demons", assumes a complete, 
logical solution exists and resources are available to find 
such a solution, or as P6lya says, a solution of complete 
certainty. One common measure of an ideal, probabilistic 
solution is to use Bayesian methods, which use statistical 
methods of probability to define an optimum solution named 
after the 18th century mathematician (International society 
for Bayesian analysis (ISBA), 2010). However, it is often 
the case resources do not exist to find a solution of complete 
certainty, furthermore, the environment in which one 
operates does not permit a solution of certainty. The 
environment may be sufficiently constrained to support a 
limited number of outcomes discoverable with heuristic 
thinking: A bounded solution-what Gigerenzer and Todd 
call ecological rationality and Simon calls satisficing. 
Visions of Reality 
I 
Unbounded 
Rationality 
I 
Demons 
I 
I 
Optimizations 
Under 
Constraints 
I 
I 
Bounded Rationality 
I 
I 
Satisficing 
I 
Fast and 
Fn1gal 
Heurisitcs 
Figure I. Visions ofreality, adapted from "Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The Adaptive Toolbox," by G. Gigerenzer and P. M. 
Todd, 1999, Simple Heuristics Which Make Us Smart,p. 4. Copyright 1999 by Oxford University Press. 
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A common theme of the accidents shown in Table 
1 is that, while preventable, the accidents did not point to 
deficiency or negligence by an individual, rather to a failure 
of the aviation system. As the ICAO Safety Management 
Manual (SMM) points out, the safety adage that 70% of all 
accidents are caused by human error is a flawed perspective, 
"Simply put: humans design, manufacture, train, operate, 
manage and defend the system. Therefore, when the system 
breaks down, it is of necessity due to human error. From this 
perspective and depending upon the level of observation, 
one hundred per cent of accidents are arguably caused by 
human error'' (International Civil Aviation Organization 
[ICAO], 2009, p. 7-14). 
Jn the language of Safety Management Systems 
(SMS), the accidents of Table 1 had a certain chance of 
occurrence, given the probabilistic nature of the 
environment intersected with human decision making as 
opposed to a deterministic endeavor (Dismukes et al., 2007). 
Spoken in a different vernacular, in Fate is the Hunter, 
Gann says, 
And sometimes they [accident investigators] 
discover a truth which they can explain in the hard, 
clear terms of mechanical science. They must 
never, regardless of their discoveries, write off a 
crash as simply a case of bad luck. They must 
never, for fear of ridicule, admit other than to 
themselves, which they all do, that some totally 
unrecognizable genie has once again unbuttoned 
his pants and urinated on the pillar of science. 
(Gann, 1961, p. 9) 
The end result is the operational environment of 
aviation is a resource constrained environment in variety of 
dimensions, including time and information. Jn this 
environment it is not always possible to attain a theoretically 
certain solution and only something less is possible: a 
plausible solution based on a bounded view of rationality. 
Where Gigerenzer and Todd have the Demons of 
unbounded rationality, Gann's genie is the resource 
constrained, bounded rationality. The aim of this paper is to 
transform the literary eloquence of Gann into a structured 
heuristic based categorization of cognitive processes which 
lead to human factor errors. 
Heursitics, satisficing, ecological rationality and 
bounded rationality are concepts which can aptly be defined 
by Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM). NDM is ''the 
study of how people use their experience to make decisions 
in field settings. We try to understand how people handle all 
of the typical confusions and pressures of their 
environments, such as missing information, time constraints, 
vague goals and changing conditions" (Klein, 1999, p. 1). 
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Klein points out NDM research funding started in the early 
1980s by the U.S. Army and later by the U.S. Navy 
following the shoot down of an Iranian airliner by the USS 
Vincennes in 1988. Various researchers agree that the way 
people make time pressured decisions is not via a process of 
generating internal probabilities and comparing rational 
option sets, rather, decision makers use categorization of 
prior experience to solve new problems, often including 
rapid mental simulation of outcomes. These mental 
simulations are inferential based on past experiences and 
training (Klein, 2008). 
Gigerenzer and Todd's view of unbounded 
rationality versus bounded rationality and Klein's 
perspective on NDM are part of the F AA's Risk 
Management Handbook. After pointing out the distinction 
between analytical decision making as a method useful 
when time is available, the handbook goes on to discuss 
automatic and naturalistic decision making as a useful tool 
in time critical situations. While the handbook mentions 
NDM, it makes no direct mention of heuristics and has only 
two references to the general topic ofbiases, which are often 
a byproduct of heuristic thinking (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2009). If the cognitive processes of pilots 
are in fact modeled by heuristics, then it is plausible to 
suggest decision making education and training should 
include a discussion of heuristics. 
While cognitive issues discussed thus far offer a 
possibility for increasing the performance of aviation 
personnel, heuristic classification of cognitive issues may 
offer another dimension to aviation safety reporting 
programs, such as the Aviation Safety Reporting Program 
(ASRS) or Aviation Safety Action Programs (ASAP). 
Hendrickson notes in his doctoral thesis revolving around 
ASRS data, 
The lack of a standard classification scheme 
available for sorting the numerous incident reports 
submitted to ASRS has led to difficulties in 
analyzing the incidents. There is great depth of 
information available within these reports, and yet 
it has remained largely untapped .... airlines are at 
a loss as how to fully evaluate and analyze the 
reports they are presented with. Although much 
emphasis on incidents and accidents is placed on 
what happened, a more important question is why 
it happened. (Hendrickson, 2009, pp. 13-14) 
If heuristic categories, cognitive biases and NDM 
are in fact representative of human cognition in operational 
settings, then these rules may point to a new dimension in 
classification of error modes in accidents and incidents. The 
Threat and Error Management Model (TEM) developed by 
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the University of Texas was driven, in part, by a similar 
desire to categorize ASAP human factors data into a 
taxonomy based on an empirically derived model of flight 
crew behavior. TEM categorizes flight crew actions into 
threats, errors and undesired aircraft states. This ontology is 
not only applied to ASAP report categorization, but is also 
the basis of a training program to enhance flight crew 
performance. Much of the success of TEM has been 
attributed to it originating in a naturalistic setting, that of 
Line Operations Safety Audits (LOSA) (Merritt & Klinect, 
2006). 
The LOSA approach used to develop TEM is 
consistent with the Critical Incident Technique defined by 
Flanagan in 1954. Flanagan described the technique as, 
"The critical incident technique consists of a set of 
procedures for collecting direct observations of human 
behavior in such a way as to facilitate their potential 
usefulness in solving practical problems and developing 
broad psychological principles" (Flanagan, 1954, p. 1). 
Flanagan credits the evolution of the technique to the pilot 
selection process used by the Army Air Forces in the early 
1940s during World War II. The critical incident technique 
involves a systematic interview process with individuals 
who performed a specific job function or engaged in a 
critical . incident. The systematic method allows the 
qualitative data of interviews to be transforriied into 
quantitatively useful conclusions. Flanagan described 
general application areas of the technique, including: " ... (a) 
Measures of typical performance (criteria); (b) measures of 
proficiency (standard samples); (c) training; (d) selection 
and classification; (e) job design and purification; (t) 
operating procedures; (g) equipment design; (h) motivation 
and leadership (attitudes); [and] (i) counseling and 
psychotherapy" (Flanagan, 1954, Uses of the Critical 
Incident Technique section, para. 1). Flanagan cites 
numerous successes of the technique including the 
development of the Ethical Standards of Psychologists after· 
the review of more than 1,000 critical incidents from this 
field. 
A report in 1974 by NASA attempted to categorize 
human factors causes based on a detailed review of 74 
accidents selected from a broader set of 200 accidents 
investigated by the NTSB from 1958 to 1970. This analysis 
used the computational abilities of 1974 in an attempt to 
cluster human factors causes after researchers manually 
identified factors in accidents and coded them against a 
taxonomy developed for the study. The codes were 
numerically assigned and grouped in an effort to detect 
patterns. One conclusion reached by the 1974 report was, 
"An over-all observation from the decision data leads us to 
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recommend further research into the decision-making role 
of the pilot. The present cockpit environment has been 
shown to be less than ideal for a pilot to be a reliable 
decision maker" (Kowalsky, Masters, Stone, Babcock, & 
Rypka, 1974, p. 49). 
Since the 1974 NASA report, numerous attempts 
have been made at classification of human factors. In 
addition to TEM model, there is the ASRS anomaly codes, 
ICAO Accident/Incident Data Reporting System, Human 
Factors Analysis and Classification System (HF ACS) and 
Aviation Causal Contributors for Event Reporting System 
(ACCERS) (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008). Each of 
these models has strengths and weaknesses. Each is based 
on human behavior and as such, touches upon cognitive 
processes and biases. None of the models, however, are 
heuristic centric. 
The review of heuristics, cognitive biases, NDM 
and classifications of human factors data leads to the 
following possible hypothesis for further research: The 
incorporation of vivid re-enactments of decision making 
scenarios in training, categorized by heuristic features and 
combined with training in heuristics, will improve the 
decision making performance of flight crews in time-limited 
scenarios compared to those crews not provided such 
training. 
In order to address the plausibility of research 
supporting this hypothesis, a literature review of cognitive 
processes and NDM follows. 
Cognitive Literature Review 
This section presents an inventory of cognitive 
constructs drawn from heuristics and NDM. Where 
applicable, the summary of 19 accidents in Table 1 are used 
as a concrete example of the construct. 
While many of the constructs are presented with 
negative examples, each has some positive value. In fact, it 
is the actual or perceived positive value which causes the 
construct to persist as a decision making technique, either 
overtly or unknowingly. 
Checklists and Mnemonics 
Checklists are the simplest form of a heuristic as 
they specify a procedure or rule (Bach & Bolton, 2007). A 
checklist requires a context for usage and a skilled 
practitioner for execution. Mnemonics are sometime used as 
a memory aid for checklists. Incident 19, American 1420 is 
an example of failed checklist usage. 
Proverbs 
P6lya recognizes the double edge nature of 
proverbs in problem solving, "It would be foolish to regard 
proverbs as an authoritative source of universally applicable 
wisdom but it would be a pity to disregard the graphic 
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description of heuristic procedures provided by proverbs" 
(1985, p. 113). In aviation, there are numerous proverbs 
which follow the guidance of P6lya. "Hours of boredom 
with minutes of pure horror" imparts a warning about 
complacency. "God-Slob" or "ego shutdown" represent 
overbearing cockpit management styles leading to loss of 
crew resource management effectiveness in the cockpit (J .R. 
Cannon, personal communication June 20, 2010). 
Analogy 
Analogy is a common heuristic used to draw 
inferences between similar events. Understanding analogy 
is important as, " ... people often use vague, ambiguous, 
incomplete, or incompletely clarified analogies" (P6lya, 
1985, p. 41). 
Analogy is a simple and often used heuristic. Like 
other cognitive models, overt awareness of usage avoids 
misuse and capitalizes on strengths, "It would be foolish to 
regard the plausibility of such conjectures [analogy] as 
certainty, but it would be just as foolish, or even more 
foolish, to disregard such plausible conjectures" (P6lya, 
1985, p. 43). Incident 7, Ryan 590 provides an example of 
analogy of past experiences. 
Auxiliary Elements 
P6lya defines this heuristic as "An element that we 
introduce in the hope that it will further the solution is an 
auxiliary elemenf' (1985, p. 46). Flight training examples of 
the addition of auxiliary elements include using a mental or 
physical geometric overlay of the directional gyro to 
visualize a holding pattern entry or traffic pattern entry. 
Auxiliary elements may also include placing objects in key 
places in the cockpit as a reminder aid, such as a laminated 
checklist between throttles as a reminder of a cross feed 
operation. 
Decomposing and Recombining 
Breaking a problem into smaller parts is a 
fundamental act of problem solving. Simply put, a problem 
is broken into parts and then recombined into a whole. The 
challenge is, "Too many or too minute particulars are a 
burden on the mind. They may prevent you from giving 
sufficient attention to the main point, or even seeing the 
main point at all" (P6lya, 1985, p. 76). 
The 1972 Eastern Airlines flight 401 accident may 
offer a telling portrayal of this heuristic. In this accident the 
flight crew allowed the diagnosis of a landing gear indicator 
light to lead to controlled flight into the terrain of the Florida 
Everglades. 
Availability Heuristic 
The availability heuristic is an easily understood 
and often cited heuristic in cognitive biases. The heuristic is 
defined as, "People using this heuristic judge an event as 
JAAER, Spring 2011 
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likely or frequent if instances of it are easy to imagine or 
recall" (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1982, p. 465). An 
everyday example of this heuristic is the fear people 
experience to go in the water after watching the movie Jaws. 
In Table 1, incident number 15 involving American 903 
suggests the crew discussion of convective activity led them 
to improperly associate a stall with wind shear rather than a 
stall caused by insufficient airspeed. The result was an 
inappropriate selection of recovery technique based in part 
on the availability heuristic. 
The availability heuristic inhuman thought is based 
upon how people use repetition as means to remember 
information. The availability heuristic inverts the repetition 
technique and uses the strength of association to judge 
frequency of occurrence. While the availability heuristic is 
a source of cognitive bias, it is also recognized as an 
"ecologically valid clue for the judgment of frequency 
because, in general, frequent events are easier to recall or 
imagine then infrequent ones" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 
p. 164). 
Representativeness Heuristic 
This heuristic is widely known in statistical circles 
and is described as ''people believe samples to be very 
similar to one another and to the population from which they 
are drawn. We also suggested that people believe sampling 
to be a self-correcting process" (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1982, p. 25). An everyday example of this heuristic is the 
gambler's fallacy of believing a sequence of bad luck will 
be corrected or balanced by a sequence of good luck. 
In flight operations, the representativeness heuristic 
may be used by pilots to judge the acceptability of 
continuing a flight operation in adverse conditions based on 
a sampling of other aircraft successfully executing the same 
operation. While this technique often works given the 
ecological reality of flight operations, misuse of 
representativeness in changing conditions may lead to 
negative outcomes. Incident 1, USAir 1016 demonstrates 
failure of the representative heuristic when a prior aircraft 
reported a smooth ride yet flight 1016 experienced 
windshear. 
Adjustments from Anchor Heuristic 
The adjustment from anchor heuristic is described 
as "anchor on a specific cue or value and then adjust that 
value to account for other elements of the circumstance. 
Usually the adjustment is insufficient. So, once the anchor 
is set, there is a bias toward that value" (Lehner, Seyed-
Solorforough, O'Connor, Sak, & Mullin, 1997, p. 699). In 
aviation parlance, this is often known as get-there-itis and in 
cognitive circles as plan continuation bias. 
There are numerous examples in aviation of the 
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anchoring heuristic. Table 1, incident 5, Southwest 1455 
demonstrates a crew continuing an approach in the face of 
numerous other inputs indicating abandonment of the 
approach was the more suitable option. 
Knowing with Certainty and Confirmation Bias 
The consequence of the cognitive belief of 
certainty is overconfidence and lack of questioning the 
accuracy of the fact in question. Cognitive research has 
shown a cause of unwarranted certainty is ''people's lack of 
awareness that their knowledge is based on assumptions that 
are often quite tenuous" (Slovic et al., 1982). While 
certainty has been the debate of philosophers far beyond the 
scope of this paper, in the context of flight operations, 
Gigerenzer and Todd frame the issue concisely as, 
" ... Nature is deterministic and certain; but for humans, 
Nature is fickle and uncertain. Mortals cannot know the 
world, but must rely on uncertain inferences, on bets rather 
than on demonstrative proof' (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999, p. 
8). Knowing with certainty in time pressured decision 
environments inherently conflicts with the need to have 
certain foundations upon which to act. 
Related to certainty is the heuristic of confirmation 
bias. Lehner describes this as "People tend to seek and focus 
on confirming evidence, with the result that once they've 
formed a judgment, they tend to ignore or devalue 
disconfirming evidence" (Lehner et al., 1997, p. 699). Table 
1, incident 9, the gear up landing of Continental 1943 
demonstrates an example of confirmation bias. 
Frequency Bias and Quick Estimation 
Lehner defines this heuristic as "People often judge 
the strength of predictive relations by focusing on the 
absolute frequency of events rather than their observed 
relative frequency. . . Information on the nonoccurrence of 
an event is often unavailable and frequently ignored when 
available" (1997, p. 699). Contrasting Lehner's view are 
those ofHertwig, Hoffrage andMartignon, who demonstrate 
an opposite view (citing Jonides and Jones), "'Ask about the 
relative numbers of many kinds of events, and you are likely 
to get answers that reflect the actual relative frequencies of 
events with great fidelity"' (1999, p. 212). 
The conflict between the two interpretations of 
frequency bias points may be reconciled by an ecological 
context, " ... what is the structure of the environments in 
which quantification occurs, and what heuristics can exploit 
that structure?" (Hertwig et al., 1999, p. 215). Hertwig et al. 
point out while many frequency distributions have a normal 
distribution or bell shaped curve, a large number of 
frequency occurrences have a skewed normal distribution or 
j-shaped curve, an example being the distribution of medals 
won in the Olympic games in a given year by various 
Page44 
countries. 
One inference to be noted from the disagreement is 
highly skewed populations are less likely to suffer from 
frequency bias. A negative aspect is an omitted frequency is 
likely to be ignored. 
Concrete Information 
The concrete information heuristic is framed as, 
"Information that is vivid or based on experience or 
incidents dominates abstract information, such as summaries 
or statistical base-rates ... Concrete and vivid information 
contributes to the imaginability [sic] of the information and, 
in turn, enhances its impact on inference" (Lehner et al., 
1997, p. 699). In everyday terms, the greater the impact of 
an experience, the more it is remembered. 
The concrete information heuristic is used by Klein 
in Sources of Power in part to suggest how novices can be 
trained to think like experts. Klein writes how expert stories, 
" ... contain many lessons and are useful as a form of 
vicarious experience for people who did not witness the 
incident ... A good story is a package of different causal 
relationships--what factors resulted in what effects ... a story 
records an event that happened within a natural context" 
(Klein, 1999, pp. 179-181 ). Stories, often expressed as 
retrospectives, have the potential to impart concrete 
information to those who did not directly experience an 
event. This is not to say stories should replace procedural 
knowledge, however, for the development of inferential 
skills vivid, vicarious stories may hold tremendous value. 
In the area of flight training, the methods available 
to impart concrete information to students include flight 
training, simulator training, reenactments, observation 
flights and lecture-each with its own monetary cost, time 
commitment and value. In speaking with David Zwegers, 
Director of Flight Safety of Embry Riddle, the author 
inquired about the frequency of the use of emotive 
reenactments in the pilot training program. Mr. Zwegers 
indicated reenactments were used occasionally, but not to a 
great degree, and observation rides in simulators with other 
students would be more common. He also noted Embry-
Riddle would soon . be using Flight Operations Quality 
Assurance (FOQA) data from training flights to replay flight 
information (personal communication, June 14, 2010). The 
author agrees with Klein when he says, "The method we 
have found most powerful for eliciting knowledge is to use 
stories" (Klein, 1999, p. 189). A demonstration comparing 
an emotive and non-emotive way of imparting knowledge is 
available at http://www.tuccio.com/dav712a. Additionally, 
the AOPA Air Safety Foundation has a number of 
instructional and emotive, interactive courses at 
http://www.aopa.org/asf. 
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Regression Towards the Mean 
This heuristic of this behavior suggests people 
misattribute cause and effect rather than recognizing 
statistical normal distributions. That is, 
... maximum performance is usually followed by 
less than maximum performance (i.e., towards the 
mean) and minimum performance is followed by 
greater than minimum performance ... In a 
discussion of flight training, experienced 
instructors noted that praise for an exceptional 
smooth landing is typically followed by a poorer 
landing ... while harsh criticism after a rough 
landing is usually followed by an improvement on 
the next try. The instructors concluded that verbal 
rewards are detrimental towards learning, while 
verbal punishments are beneficial, contrary to 
accepted psychological doctrine. (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974, p. 1127). 
Awareness of regression towards the mean is similar to the 
learning curve known as the learning plateau, where student 
progress slows after a period of growth (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2008). However, there may be advantages 
of expressing the human behavior from both perspectives, 
as each allows insight into cognitive processes. 
Recognition Heuristic 
In its simplest form, the recognition heuristic is the 
ability to recall something from memory as unknown, 
familiar or well known. Recognition is then used to make 
inferences about objects related to the recognized object. In 
other words, an inaccessible thing to be measured is 
measured by an accessible mediator (Goldstein & 
Gigerenzer, 1999). Absent human cognition, numerous 
measurement instruments use mediators, in aviation altitude 
and airspeed are measured by calibrations of pressure and 
predictions of turbulence are based on rainfall intensity. 
In certain domains of knowledge, when the object 
to be measured has directional correlation to the mediator 
which can be recognized, the recognition heuristic may offer 
reliable benefits to the user, absent a more deterministic 
method. An academic example is to ask subjects unfamiliar 
with population sizes of cities to judge which cities are 
larger based solely upon their recognition of the city name. 
When this experiment has been attempted, not only did it 
yield significant results, it actually showed subjects more 
ignorant of the true population numbers scored better than 
the informed group. This leads to Gigerenzer and Goldstein 
to state a less-is-more heuristic "occurs when the 
recognition validity is greater than the knowledge validity" 
( 1999, p. 46). Misused, the less-is-more heuristic could yield 
disastrous consequences in aviation; however, as a building 
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block in a cognitive process, understanding the use of 
accessible mediators to infer inaccessible things is a 
valuable skill. 
One broad example of the accessible pointing to 
the inaccessible is go/no-go decision. This fundamental 
safety decision in inaccessible and it is arrived at by looking 
at directionally accessible indicators for the determination. 
Minimalist, Take the Last, Take the Best Heuristics 
Benjamin Franklin proposed what he called Moral 
or Prudential Algebra, or Franklin's Rule as a method to 
make decisions; In its simplest sense, the method involves 
making a list of pros and cons, applying weights to each 
factor, adding up the result and taking the higher result to 
make a decision. An attempt to execute Franklin's Rule 
considering all factors and using regression techniques may 
result in problems challenging even to computers. Building 
on the representative heuristic, Gigerenzer and Todd suggest 
what is needed for time and resource limited decision 
making is a stopping rule (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999). 
A simple heuristic, the "Minimalisf' prescribes if 
one feature is recognized and another is not, stop the search 
for cues and use the recognized feature as the basis of 
inference to make an inferential choice. If both features are 
recognized, choose another cue and continue the process 
until something is not recognized. A modified version of the 
Minimalist approach is, "Take the Last" which tries to 
positively use the Einstellung Effect. The Einstellung Effect 
suggests people have a predisposition to solve a new 
problem based on a prior success, even though the new 
problem may not be best suited by the prior solution 
method. In the Take the Last approach, the order of cue 
selection is based on a prior success of cue selection. A 
modification of Take the Last is "Take the Best", whereby 
one orders the cues selected based on their highest inference 
validity to solving the problem. The order of selection is 
based either on intuition or institutional learning (Gigerenzer 
& Goldstein, 1999). 
While these heuristics may seem trivial in their 
presentation, in the opinion of the author, this type of 
heuristic is used in practice for the deviation around 
thunderstorms based on weather radar interpretation. The 
weather radar interpreter looks for recognized features, takes 
the best match of prior familiarity, and uses that as the basis 
of inference for best path selection. Thunderstorm deviation 
is often a satisficing solution process. 
Classical Decision Making (Non-Heuristic Alternative) 
In a classical decision making model, the rational 
choice method includes: Consider a wide range of options; 
consider various objectives; weigh costs, risks, benefits of 
each option; search for new information in evaluating 
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options; assimilate all new information; consider the 
positive and negative consequences and risks; and plan for 
alternatives if the risks occur. Klein points out in time-
pressured situations, some flaws with this plan include, 
" ... you do not have all the data you need, or are not sure 
how to do the ratings, or disagree with the weights, or run 
out of time before you have finished" (Klein, 2008, pp. 28-
29). 
Klein continues to point out in many scenarios the 
rational choice method is appropriate. However, in a time or 
resource constrained domain, the rational choice method 
ollly serves as a model, not how people really think in time-
pressured, resource constrained scenarios. 
Recognition-Primed Decision Model 
In response to a request in 1984 by the Army to 
study how people make decisions under time pressure, Gary 
Klein defined the Recognition-Primed Decision Model 
(RPD). After living with firefighters and extensive 
interviews, Klein came up with the RPD model shown in 
Figure 2. Klein's RPD identifies three models of time 
pressured decision making all starting with recognition of a 
typical situation. In Variation 1 of the RPD, the typicality is 
obvious to the decision maker based on expert experience 
and intuition allowing a set of expectations, goals, cues and 
typical actions to be recalled and set in motion. Variation 2 
of the RPD recognizes the need to diagnose the situation to 
determine a typical situation, and then compare expectancies 
of the prototype to the actual occurrence and adapt 
accordingly. Variation 3 introduces deviations from 
typicality and how actions must be modified to suit the 
novel situation using mental simulation, again based on 
experience (Klein, 1999). 
Variation 1: Simple Match Variation 2: Diagnose Situation Variation 3: Evaluate Course of Action 
@perience Situation in Changing Context] @perience Situation in Changing Context ] 
0 
(Perceived as Typical] 
..!)-
Recognition Bv-Produds 
[Expectancies J (Relevant] 
cues 
Plausible 
Goals 
Implement 
Course of Action 
@cperlence Situation in Changing Context J 
more data {7 
Diagnose ~ [~1-s Si-"t~uati-.o-n T-yp-ica-1?-] 
Feature MatChing, c:::> ~ Story Building 
/\. Yes 
li Inference 
(Oarify] 
0 Recognition Bv-Produc.ts 
[Expectancies) (Relevant] 
Cues 
Plausible 
Goals 
Implement 
Course of Action 
0 
[Perceived as Typical}-¢ 
Plausible 
Goals 
..!)-
Figure 2. Recognition Primed Decision Model (RPD). Adapted from Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions, by G. 
Klein, 1999, p.25. 
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The RPD model is an outgrowth of the satisficing 
concepts of economist Herbert Simon, previously discussed, 
whereby tbe solution found is the first workable solution 
rather than the optimum solution. The RPD model is one 
expression of NDM and Klein reports it models 80-9()%, of 
time pressured decision making {Klein, 2008). Figure 3 
shows a comparison made by the FAA bL'tWeen a non4ime 
constrained approach to decision making and the NDM/RPD 
model advocated by Klein. 
A, Analytical 
~"'""~~~,J ' ··~~J ;:r;';_j -~~7!!;!~} 
--~~~~~.~· ~ 
t 
~~ t1· 1ir-... ii 
' 
~ R~it: or twi.w4 
.,,. Pct<fl"rMJW ®%4:fTu®% 
B. Automatic/Naturansttc 
.I ... · .. · ... ·  . ···.· \ .. ·.·.+ ..
i 
flgure 3. Comparison of convential, mm-time constrained, analytical decision making and time-constrained, naturali tic: decision 
making. From F'.4A Risk Management Handbook. by tbe Federal Aviation Administration, 2009, p. 5-5. 
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The RPD model is not purported to be fool proof, 
only a realistic model of cognition in time pressured 
decision making. fu Table 1, incident 2, the response of 
TWA 843 can be modeled in part after the RPD model 
leading to an erroneous and negative outcome. 
Research Design 
The literature review presented leads to the 
following for a research design: The incorporation of vivid 
re-enactments of decision making scenarios in training, 
categorized by heuristic features and combined with training 
in heuristics, will improve the decision making performance 
of flight crews in time-limited scenarios compared to those 
crews not provided such training. 
The elements necessary to investigate the 
hypothesis includes: (a) An inventory of heuristics and 
decision making features; (b) a collection of vivid, re-
enactments of decision making scenarios set in a natural, 
pilot environment organized by heuristic; ( c) a training 
syllabus using the heuristic taxonomy and re-enactments; ( d) 
a sufficiently large group of pilots of varied experiences to 
participate in the training; and ( e) generic, yet realistic, pilot 
performance exercises to test the trained and control groups 
to measure differences. Each of these elements is discussed 
in turn. 
Heuristic Inventory 
An inventory, building upon the ones presented in 
this paper, will be the basis of a training syllabus and as an 
organizational method for the vivid re-enactments. Each 
heuristic will consist of a cognitive explanation, practical 
examples, negative and positive aspects and quiz questions 
to verify student understanding. 
Vivid Re-Enactments 
As discussed in the section, Concrete Information, 
and central to the hypothesis, vivid re-enactments are 
believed to be a key part of inferential decision making. A 
collection of vivid re-enactments, likely taken from 
simulator sessions, or other means, will be created and 
targeted at each heuristic. The re-enactment will incorporate 
sound, realism of flight scenarios and parameters both from 
a cockpit and external perspective, along with human 
emotion designed to elicit emotive responses from the 
student. 
Training Syllabus 
A training syllabus will be developed to effectively 
administer the heuristic and re-enactment information. The 
training syllabus will incorporate standard elements of 
training, including diagnostic quizzes. 
Subject Pilots 
A statistically representative group of pilots of 
Page48 
varied experiences will be selected to participate in training. 
Two groups will exist, one which will receive the outlined 
training, another which will not. 
Pilot Performance Exercises 
The pilots who receive the training will be 
subjected to in-flight decision making, typical of aviation 
scenarios where there is limited time and incomplete 
information. Both the control group and the pilots who 
received the training will be subjected to the same exercises. 
Data Analysis 
After the training and exercises, the collected 
information will be statistically analyzed. The information 
analyzed will be the pilot performance exercises as well as 
surveys of the trained pilots and their impressions of the 
value of the training. 
Alternative Research Design 
The outlined research design is likely a resource 
intensive undertaking. An alternative design to discover 
support of interest in heuristics and NDM could be done 
using a survey. Questions designed to gauge present 
population understanding of heuristics would not only 
support the hypothesis but also help refine the full research 
design. 
Conclusions 
Heuristics persist as a cognitive strategy because 
they often work. The recognition heuristic describes the use 
of an accessible mediator to measure an inaccessible item. 
The recognition heuristic can be easily understood through 
a building block description first of how an altimeter 
measures altitude by way of pressure, then one can explain 
how the go/no-go decision uses similar accessible 
measurements to make the inaccessible decision. However, 
it is language and concepts that permit the encapsulation of 
examples into abstract constructs. Heuristics and its 
associated constructs are the language necessary to fully 
describe a key aspect of human cognition in the operational 
environment of aviation-an environment often fraught with 
incomplete information and time critical decisions. 
Mathematics Magazine from 1987 described 
·P6lya's 1944 heuristic based approach to problem solving, 
How To Solve It! in this way, "For mathematics education 
and the world of problem solving it marked a line· of 
demarcation between two eras, problem solving before and 
after P6lya" (P6lya, 1985, p. xix). If in fact heuristics plays 
such an important part in problem solving and human bias, 
then the author believes it a failing of pilot training that a 
significant part of the pilot community is not overtly 
educated in this form of cognition.+ 
JAAER, Spring 2011 
10
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 20, No. 3 [2011], Art. 8
https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol20/iss3/8
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jaaer.2011.1640
Heuristics Human Factors Aviation 
William A. Tuccio is a student in Embry-Riddle's PhD in Aviation Program and a software engineer for a defense contractor*. 
He holds an Airline Transport Certificate (ATP) with type ratings in the A TR and Shorts aircraft and has been a certified flight 
instructor for over 20 years. He has over 7,000 hours in flight time and was a captain for American Eagle for six years. He has 
worked on numerous software projects including acting as Chief Technology Officer during the initial design and rollout of 
MovieTickets.com and was the lead designer ofStickyMinds.com. He is the author of three aviation iPhone applications. Mr. 
Tuccio holds a Bachelor of Science in Aeronautical Engineering from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and a Master of 
Aeronautical Science (MAS) from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. *Since this article was originally written, Mr. Tuccio 
began work with National Transportation Safety Board in the Office of Research and Engineering. 
JAAER, Spring 2011 Page49 
11
Tuccio: Heuristics to Improve Human Factors Performance in Aviation
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2011
Heuristics Human Factors Aviation 
References 
Bach, J ., & Bolton, M. (2007). Rapid software testing (V2.1.5 ed.) Satisfice, Inc. 
Dismukes, R. K., Berman, B. A., & Loukopoulos, L. D. (2007). The limits of expertise: Rethinking pilot error and the causes 
of airline accid~nts. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2008). Aviation instructor's handbook. Washington, DC: 
Federal Aviation Administration. (2009). Risk management handbook. Washington, DC: Department of Transportation. FAA-
H-8083-2 
Flanagan, J.C. (1954). The critical incidenttechnique. Psychological Bulletin, 51(4), 327-358. doi:10.1037/h0061470 
Gann, E. K. (1961). Fate is the hunter. New York,: Simon and Schuster. 
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (1999). Betting on one good reason. In G. Gigerenzer, & P. M. Todd (Eds.), Simple 
heuristics that make us smart (pp. 75-95). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Gigerenzer, G., & Todd, P. M. (1999). Fast and frugal heuristics. In G. Gigerenzer, & P. M. Todd (Eds.), Simple heuristics 
that make us smart (pp. 3-34). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Goldstein, D. G., & Gigerenzer, G. (1999). The recognition heuristic. In G. Gigerenzer, & P. M. Todd (Eds.), Simple 
heuristics that make us smart (pp. 37-58). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Hendrickson, S. (2009). The wrong wright stuff: Mapping human error in aviation. (Ph.D., The University ofNew Mexico). 
Retrieved from 
http://ezproxy.libproxy.db.erau.edu/login?url=http://proquest.umi.comlpqdweb?did= l 81468644 l&Fmt=7&clientld=17916& 
RQT=309&VName=PQD 
Hertwig, R., Hoffrage, U., & Martignon, L. (1999). Quick estimation: Letting the environment do the work. In G. Gigerenzer, 
& P. M. Todd (Eds.), Simple heuristics that make us smart (pp. 209-234). New York: Oxford University Press. 
International Civil Aviation Organiz.ation [ICAO]. (2009). Safety management manual (SMM) (Document No. 9859 AN/474). 
Quebec, Canada: International Civil Aviation Organization. 
International Society for Bayesian Analysis (ISBA). (2010). Retrieved Jun/13, 2010, from http://www.bayesian.org/ 
Klein, G. (1999). Sources of power: How people make decisions (First ed.). Cambridge, Massaschusetts: MIT Press. 
Klein, G. (2008). Naturalistic decision making. Human Factors, 50(3), 456-460. 
Kowalsky, N. B., Masters, R. L., Stone, R. B., Babcock, G. L., & Rypka, E.W. (1974). An analysis of pilot error-related 
aircraft accidents (Contractor Report No. NASA CR-2444). Albuquerque, NM: NASA. 
Page50 JAAER, Spring 2011 
12
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 20, No. 3 [2011], Art. 8
https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol20/iss3/8
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jaaer.2011.1640
Heuristics Human Factors Aviation 
Lehner, P., Seyed-Solorforough, M., O'Connor, M. F., Sak, S., & Mullin, T. (1997). Cognitive biases and time stress in team 
decision making. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, & Cybernetics Part A: Systems & Humans, 27(5), 698-703. 
doi: 10.1109/3468.618269 
Merritt, A., & Klinect, J. (2006). Defensivejlyingfor pilots: An introduction to threat and error management. The University 
of Texas Human Factors Research Project. 
P6lya, G. (1985). How to solve it: A new aspect of mathematical method (2d ed.). Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Simon, H. A. (1956). Rational choice and the structure of the environment. Psychological Review, 63(2), 129-138. 
Slovic, P., Fischhoff, B., & Lichtenstein, S. (1982). Facts versus fears: Understanding perceived risk. In D. Kahneman, P. 
Slovic & A. Tversky (Eds.), Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (pp. 463-489). New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Stolzer, A. J., Halford, C. D., & Goglia, J. J. (2008). Safety management systems in aviation. Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1982). Belief in the law of small numbers. In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky (Eds.), 
Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (pp. 23-31 ). New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases: Biases in judgments reveal some 
heuristics of thinking under uncertainty. Science, 185( 4157), 1124-1131. 
JAAER, Spring 2011 Page 51 
13
Tuccio: Heuristics to Improve Human Factors Performance in Aviation
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2011
Heuristics Human Factors Aviation 
Table l 
Summary of Aircraft Accidents and Cognitive Analysis 
ID Flight/Year 
1 USAir 1016, 1994 
2 TWA 843, 1992 
3 AA 1572, 
1995 
4 American 
International 808, 
1993 
5 Southwest 1455, 
2000 
6 FedEx 14, 
1997 
7 Ryan 590, 
1991 
8 Tower41, 
1995 
9 Continental 1943, 
1996 
10 AA 102, 
1993 
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Encounter 
Windshear 
Erroneous Stick 
Shaker 
Descent Below 
MDA 
Missing Visual 
Cue 
Unstabilized 
Approach 
Pilot Induced 
Oscillations 
("PIO") During 
Landing 
Wing 
Contamination on 
Takeoff 
Loss of Control 
on Takeoff Roll 
Gear Up Landing 
Runway 
Excursion After 
Landing 
Appendix 
Cognitive Observations 
"Characteristic human cognitive tendencies under high workload, 
time pressure and stress ... and retrieval of declarative knowledge .. .is 
impaired." (p. 22) 
"Rapid decisions by experts are often driven by automatic retrieval 
from memory of scenarios from past experiences ... to match the current 
situation (described as 'recognition-primed decision making')." (p. 32) 
"[the flying pilot] may have been unwittingly depending on the first 
officer's [non-flying pilot] callouts his cue to take action ... Wiener and 
Curry describe examples of this phenomenon in aviation operations, 
referring to it as ''primary-backup inversion", in which a backup cue 
such as an altitude alert becomes the primary signal to which the pilot 
responds." (p. 44) 
" ... pilots, like all individuals, are vulnerable to plan continuation 
bias, which makes them slow to recognize that an original or habitual 
plan of action is no longer appropriate to the situation and must be 
revised." (p. 59) 
" ... cognitive factors probably make all individuals vulnerable to 
some degree of plan continuation errors. Among those factors are 
overconfidence bias, a tendency to overestimate one's own knowledge; 
confirmation bias, a tendency to seek and notice only those cues that 
confirm a currently held belief or plan ... ; and the anchoring heuristic, 
which weighs cues supporting the current plan more heavily than 
conflicting cues when plans are revised." (p. 78) 
" ... quickly retrieving and executing declarative knowledge in the 
midst of a PIO is at best difficult. In contrast to highly practiced 
procedural knowledge, retrieval of infrequently used declarative 
knowledge from memory is often slow and effortful." (p. 90) 
"Individual experiences may not cover the full range of possibilities 
and thus may lead to incomplete and sometimes misleading mental 
models of prototypical situations." (p. 97) 
"This accident illustrates the unanticipated ways in which habits that 
seem harmless or even advantageous in routine situations pose a latent 
threat that may cause harm when circumstances combine in just the 
wrong way." (p. 107) (described as ''practical-drift" (p. 104)) 
"In general, when confronted with a problem, individuals are prone 
to settle on an explanation that seems consistent with their previous 
experience (described as 'recognition primed decision-making by Klein, 
1997) ... The phenomenon, called confirmation bias, has been observed 
in diverse settings ... " (p.122) 
" ... under time pressure, surprise, workload, or stress individuals are 
often unable to retrieve quickly from memory all information relative to 
the situation, especially if that information is not elaborated or is not 
used frequently. Among the distinctions cognitive psychologists make 
about the ways in which information is organized and stored in memory 
is a distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge." (p. 
138 
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ID Flight/Year 
11 Continental 795, 
1994 
12 USAir405, 
1992 
13 Valujet 558, 
1996 
14 Air Transport 
International 805, 
1992 
15 American 903, 
1997 
16 Simmons 3641, 
1994 
17 
18 
19 
AA 1340, 
1998 
Delta 554, 
1996. 
American 1420, 
1999 
Encounter 
Aborted Take-Off 
Stall on Take-Off 
Landing Short of 
Runway 
Disorientation, 
Loss of Control 
in IMC 
Loss of Control at 
Altitude 
Application of 
Propeller Beta in 
Flight 
Cat II ILS 
Autopilot 
Deviation 
Landing Short of 
Runway 
Destabilized 
Approach and 
Runway 
Excursion 
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Cognitive Observations 
" ... limitations in human memory can lead individuals to confuse 
memory of performing a task many times previously or memory of 
having recently thought about performing the task with actually having 
performed the task currently." (p. 154) 
"This accident and others discussed in this book illustrate the 
difficulty expert decision-makers sometimes have in recognizing 
whether past experience and knowledge are adequate to evaluate the 
current situation." (p. 163) 
"Experts operate largely by recognizing familiar situations and 
automatically retrieving directly relevant information from memory." 
. 180 
"Individuals suddenly confronted with a totally unexpected anomaly 
with which they have no experience typically require at least a few 
seconds to recognize and evaluate the situation and decide on an 
appropriate response, and even longer if the anomaly is subtle." (p. 191) 
"This discussion [about thunderstorms in the vicinity of the flight 
path] would have primed them [flight crew] to think about possible 
consequences of the weather, such as windshear, and would have 
facilitated retrieval from memory of windshear recovery techniques 
(described as 'availability heuristic). Research on human memory has 
shown that the way individuals conceptually frame their current 
situation substantially biases what information is retrieved from 
memory and how that information is interpreted." (pp. 205-206) 
"Automatization can make us vulnerable to errors in which we 
automatically execute a response to a situation that resembles - but only 
superficially- other situations in which the response is appropriate." (p. 
220 
"Considering the inherent limitations of human reaction time to 
unexpected events that require recognition, analysis, and response 
selection, the rapidity of the large pitch-down at the moment the captain 
was transitioning to outside visual references ... " (p. 228) 
"Plan continuation bias and the difficulty of quickly and correctly 
assessing whether attempts to salvage an approach will work should be 
emphasized ... " (p. 243) 
''Under high workload and stress, individuals attempt to simplify 
their tasks and reduce mental demands. We suspect that one way pilots 
unwittingly simplify task demands in these challenging situations is to 
shift from a proactive stance to a more reactive stance, responding to 
each event as it occurs, rather than managing the overall situation 
strategically." (p. 252) 
Note: This table is not meant to imply one factor caused each accident. The intent of this table is to draw out only the 
cognitive aspects of each accident for the purpose discussing cognitive issues in a broader context. Page numbers of citations 
refer to the original source. Adapted from Dismukes, R. K., Berman, B. A., Loukopoulos, L. D., 2007, The Limits of 
Expertise: Rethinking Pilot Error and the Cause of Airline Accidents, Ashgate Publishing, Burlington, VT. 
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